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Over the past decades, many developed 
countries have experienced considerable 
increases in income and wealth inequality, 
led by an extraordinary concentration 
among the very richest swath of house-
holds. This has focused policy attention on 
the superrich. Various political and eco-
nomic arguments for at least partially off-
setting this rise in inequality have been put 
forward. In particular, politicians have 
called for increasing the tax burden on rich 
households, both in the form of higher top 
rates for existing income taxes as well as 
new tax levies targeting the superrich. 
Most prominently, the idea of introducing 
an annual wealth tax has recently gained 
attention in the United States.
This Public Paper provides an overview of 
the tax situation the superrich currently 
face and evaluates various reform propos-
als. We emphasize that the incomes of the 
superrich are qualitatively different from 
others. Some are “superstars,” for whom 
small differences in talent are magnified 
into much larger earnings differences, 
while others work in winner-take-all mar-
kets, meaning that their effort to climb 
the ladder of success reduces the returns 
to others. Moreover, the discussion about 
tax rates must be accompanied by atten-
tion to the tax base, with a special focus 
on capital gains, which comprise a large 
fraction of the taxable income of the 
superrich. We also review the pros and 
cons of wealth taxes versus alternative 
policies that achieve similar objectives. 
While a dozen OECD countries levied 
wealth taxes in the recent past, only three 
retain them at present. Only Switzerland 
raises a similar fraction of revenue with 
its wealth tax as the recent U.S. propos-
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The recent focus on how the very rich are 
taxed is tied to widespread concern about 
the extent and growth of inequality. 
Indeed, the top 1% of households ranked 
by income in the U.S. earned about 12% 
of total income in the early 1980s, but this 
share has recently doubled to almost 25% 
(World Inequality Database). The concen-
tration of wealth is even more extreme, 
with the top 1% ranked by net wealth 
holding roughly 40% of the United States’ 
total wealth in recent years, as opposed to 
roughly 25% in the 1980s. Many other 
advanced countries have experienced simi-
lar trends, although typically less pro-
nounced. Notably, Switzerland has seen a 
much less steep increase in inequality: The 
top 1% share of income has increased 
from about 8% in the 1980s to 12% more 
recently, and the top 1% wealth share 
from 33% to 40%.1
Not surprisingly, the discussion about 
inequality and tax justice has intensified 
in many countries. Particular attention 
has been devoted to whether the very rich-
est individuals in our society pay their 
“fair share” of taxes, or whether there are 
deficiencies in how our current tax system 
addresses the superrich. For example, the 
British historian Rutger Bregman’s call 
for action at last year’s World Economic 
Forum in Davos, “We’ve got to talk about 
taxes, taxes, taxes!”, went viral. Accord-
ingly, policy makers have made various 
proposals to increase taxes on top earners 
and wealth holders, in some cases dramat-
ically. In the United States, newly elected 
but immediately prominent Congress-
woman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez pro-
posed adding a new 70% income tax 
bracket on income in excess of $10 mil-
lion in 2019. Two former presidential  
candidates, Senators Bernie Sanders and 
Elizabeth Warren, proposed that the 
United States enact an annual wealth tax. 
Warren proposed a 2% rate on net worth 
in excess of $50 million and a 6% rate 
above $1 billion, while Sanders’s proposal 
featured graduated rates starting at 1% on 
net worth above $32 million for a married 
couple, rising to a marginal annual tax 
rate of 8% on net worth above $10 billion 
(which would currently affect less than 50 
persons). In the United Kingdom, the 
2017 Labour Party manifesto proposed 
reintroducing a 50% top income tax rate, 
5% higher than the current rate. France 
levied a top marginal income “supertax” 
rate of 75% on earnings over 1 million 
Euros from 2012 to 2014, but scrapped it 
and returned to a 45% top rate in 2015.
Designing the tax system in a way that 
captures the superrich adequately is 
important because the potential revenue 
effects are large. Indeed, it is often 
pointed out that those at the top of the 
distribution (such as the top 1%) already 
account for a disproportional share of 
total tax revenue. While this is true, 
such statistics are not a meaningful mea-
sure of the amount of redistribution a 
country’s tax system achieves. The rea-
son is that they conflate the inequality in 
pretax incomes with the progressivity of 
the tax code. To take an example, in a 
country with an extremely unequal pre-
tax income distribution where the top 
1% earn all of the income and everyone 
else earns nothing, the top 1% will also 
bear all of the tax burden no matter how 
progressive the tax system is (i.e., even 
under a flat or regressive tax schedule). 
It is therefore more informative to look 
at average tax rates. Accordingly, we 
will begin with shedding light on the 
average tax rate of the superrich and 
how it compares to those further down 
the distribution.
Why do taxes on the  
superrich matter?
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Data on very rich households often 
focus on the top 400 in the U.S., which 
comprise the top 0.0003% of house-
holds, but also address the top 0.01% 
to 1% of all households.2 A conceptu-
ally more important definitional issue  
is whether to measure affluence with 
wealth or income. We begin with wealth.
The superrich by wealth
Because billionaires have been singled 
out in some of the latest tax proposals 
in the U.S., it is worth studying them in 
more detail. The best-known data about 
billionaires is the annual Forbes 400 list 
of the wealthiest Americans, going back 
to 1982, which is based on public infor-
mation supplemented by investigative 
reporting. The cutoff to make it into the 
Forbes 400 in 2018 was a net worth of 
$2.1 billion, and the average wealth in 
this group was $7.2 billion. The share 
of aggregate U.S. wealth owned by the 
Forbes 400 has increased from less than 
1% in 1982 to more than 3% in 2018.
Figure 1 shows how the industry compo-
sition of the Forbes 400’s wealth-generat-
ing businesses has changed between 1982 
and 2018. Businesses in the financial sec-
tor have increased in representation from 
7% to 22% and in the technology sector 
from 4% to 17%. This aligns with the 
most well-known names on the list, such 
as investor Warren Buffet (founder of 
Berkshire Hathaway and number 3 on 
the list) and tech founders Jeff Bezos 
(Amazon, number 1 on the list) and Bill 
Gates (founder of Microsoft and number 
2 on the list). On the other hand, the 
representation of the energy sector fell 
from 22% to 6% and of the real estate 
sector from 17% to 9% during the same 
time frame. Nonetheless, even today, 
there is still a significant share of busi-
nesses in traditional sectors. This includes 
production and manufacturing, such as 
Charles Koch and the heirs of his late 
brother David Koch, owners of Koch 
Industries, and retail, such as the Walton 
family, founders of Walmart.
Another important distinction, particu-
larly when it comes to the taxation of 
the superrich, is whether they are “self-
made,” i.e., whether they accumulated 
their wealth themselves, or whether they 
Who are the superrich?
Source: Scheuer and Slemrod (2020a).
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Fig. 1   Industry composition of the Forbes 
 400’s wealth-generating businesses
6
UBS Center Public Paper Taxing the superrich: Challenges of a fair tax system
inherited most of it. Figure 2 shows that 
the share of first-generation founders  
has increased significantly, from 44% in 
1982 to 69% in 2018. The average age 
of those on the Forbes 400 list has 
decreased as well, which illustrates how, 
thanks to globalization and technology, 
they could expand their businesses vastly 
and extremely quickly, allowing them to 
build very large fortunes within their 
lifetimes. The Forbes 400 in 2018 were 
also well educated, 86% graduated from 
college, up from 76% in 1982.
The superrich by income
Our comments above only considered 
wealth. What about income? For tax 
years 1992 to 2014, the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) released aggre-
gated information about the 400 individ-
ual tax returns with the highest gross 
incomes. The cutoff for inclusion into 
the “Fortunate 400” rose from $24 mil-
lion in 1992 to $127 million in 2014. 
The share of total income the top 400 
earned more than doubled, from 0.5% in 
1992 to 1.3% in 2014, while their share 
of the total number of filed income tax 
returns fell slightly. Their share of the 
total amount of income taxes paid also 
increased, but by not quite as much, 
from 1% to 2%, reflecting in part the 
fact that their average tax rate fell over 
this time from 26% to 23%. Notably, 
the average tax rate did not just fall dur-
ing this period; its lowest point in the 
period was 17% in 2007. As the Public 
Paper will discuss below, the majority of 
the Fortunate 400’s income stems from 
capital gains, and capital gains taxation 
is crucial in determining their average 
tax rate. For example, their average tax 
rate jumped from 17% to 23% between 
2012 and 2013, reflecting the fact that 
the top marginal tax rate on long-term 
capital gains rose from 15% to 20% 
between these two years.
Bakija, Cole, and Heim have studied the 
occupational composition of top income 
earners in the U.S., defined as the top 
0.01%, from 1979 to 2005 using tax 
administrative data.3 They find that 
executives, managers, supervisors, and 
financial professionals accounted for 
approximately 60% of this group in 
2005. Compared to 1979, the share of 
executives, managers, or supervisors 
decreased from roughly 48% to roughly 
43%, while the share of financial profes-
sionals increased from 11% to 18%, and 
the increase in the share of income stem-
ming from these professions accounts for 
70% of the growth in the income share 
of the top 0.1%. Individuals in the top 
0.1% saw their income grow at consider-
ably higher rates than individuals in the 
same occupations within the 99th to 
99.5th percentile range. We will turn 
below to the potential reasons for this 
fanning out at the very top.
The canonical definition of income is con-
sumption plus the change in wealth. How-
ever, the measure of income considered so 
far has been based on a country’s defini-
tion of taxable income. The principal 
omissions are inheritances and unrealized 
capital gains, but also often exclude unre-
ported (i.e., evaded) income, legitimately 
tax-exempt income, the implicit flow of 
services from durable goods (mainly 
owner-occupied housing), and the accrual 
of rights through insurance and pension 
Source: Scheuer and Slemrod (2020a).
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Composition of the Forbes 400 into first- versus 
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Fig. 2   Self-made vs. heirs in the Forbes 400
1982 2018
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plans. Notably because of the importance 
of unrealized capital gains at the very  
top of the income distribution, realized 
income can be a poor measure of well-
being, and taxable income data generally 
understates actual economic inequality.
Economic mobility
So far, we have taken a one-shot static 
view of income inequality. In reality, 
individuals face a productivity profile 
over their lifetimes, as well as random 
shocks to their earnings, which produce 
“churn” in the cross-sectional income 
distribution from year to year. As to the 
taxation of top incomes, it is then crucial 
to determine how the composition of the 
superrich varies over time. Do top earn-
ers have consistently high incomes, or 
are many of them only temporarily at the 
top of the distribution in any given year? 
The answer to this question affects our 
view of who the superrich are and hence 
how they should be taxed.
The “Fortunate 400” data collected by 
the IRS provides some information on 
the persistence of top incomes. This data, 
which covers the years 1992 to 2014, 
provides information about the 400 indi-
viduals with the highest reported income 
in each year. Over the 23 years covered, 
4,584 unique taxpayers made it onto the 
list, compared to the total of 9,200 slots 
available if there was absolutely no over-
lap across years. 138 taxpayers made 
the top 400 in 10 or more years, while 
the vast majority of 3,262 showed up in 
just one of the years. In interpreting this 
apparently low persistence, however, one 
must keep in mind the importance of 
realized capital gains in the gross income 
of the Fortunate 400: Realized gains 
show particularly high volatility that 
usually does not reflect variation in true 
annual economic income. For example, a 
founder of a startup company who sells 
her shares upon a successful exit will 
realize large capital gains in the year of 
the exit, but typically not in the previous 
or subsequent years. Thus, the numbers 
in large part tell us that there is a lot of 
churn year to year among those who 
realize large gains.
Considering larger groups of top earners, 
among those in the top 0.01% of the 
income distribution in 1996 (roughly 
12,000 households), only 23% still 
showed up in this group 10 years later. 
However, over 80% of them remained 
within the top 1%, and only 6% dropped 
out of the top quintile in 2005. Figure 3 
plots the one- to five-year persistence 
rates of those in the top 1% of the 
income distribution in 2005. For instance, 
39% of individuals already exit the top 
percentile the following year.
Given the churn in annual incomes at the 
top, one might consider wealth as a bet-
ter indicator of lifetime inequality. Using 
the Forbes 400 data on the wealthiest 
Americans, we compute the one- to five-
year survival rates of those on this list in 
2005, and compare them to the survival 
rates for income in Figure 3. This indeed 
reveals the much higher persistence of 
top wealth. For instance, of those who 
were among the Forbes 400 in 2005, 







  Wealth (Forbes 400)
  Income (Top 1%)
Reoccurence rate for the top 1% income  earners in 
2005 and those with wealth
Fig. 3 Top 1% income survival rates in the   
 Forbes 400
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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89% percent were still listed in 2006, 
and 71% remained in 2010. In fact, the 
wealth persistence of the superrich has 
risen considerably over the last few 
decades. The left panel of Figure 4 
shows the share of those in the Forbes 
400 in each given year who were on the 
list in all 10 prior years. This share has 
risen from less than 35% in 1992 to 
almost 60% in 2018, even though the 
share of “self-made” business founders 
has increased during the same period. 
Indeed, while the persistence of inherited 
wealth has remained relatively stable, 
the overall trend is driven by the fact 
that even “self-made” wealth has 
become more and more persistent  
over time (right panel of Figure 4).
Source: Scheuer and Slemrod (2020a).
Notes: The left panel depicts the share of those in the Forbes 400 for 10 continuous years prior, from 
1992–2018. Right panel shows the decomposition into those classified as self-made versus heirs. 
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What is the current tax system and what 
burden does it place on those at the top 
of the distribution? The highlighted sec-
tion on the following pages (p. 12–14) 
provides some relevant indicators on stat-
utory taxes for developed (OECD) coun-
tries.
The effective tax burden on the 
superrich
Assessing the burden of taxes on the 
superrich by examining statutory rates 
gives an incomplete picture. First is the 
issue of shifting, or incidence. Taxes that 
are legally paid by the superrich may be 
shifted via tax-induced changes in pre-
tax prices. For example, if taxes reduce 
the labor supply of high-skilled individu-
als, this could increase the wages that 
firms are willing to pay them, thus shift-
ing part of the tax burden onto firms. 
The extent to which this happens de-
pends on the nature of income. Below  
we discuss how such general equilibrium 
effects affect the optimal taxation of the 
superrich.
Second, the effective tax rate depends  
on how effective a country’s enforcement 
system is in constraining tax evasion. 
Evasion distorts the measurement of 
both income and wealth – and taxes on 
these bases – especially when data is 
derived from tax returns. Evasion by the 
superrich is difficult to uncover through 
traditional means like random audits, as 
the auditor typically lacks the resources 
to trace the sophisticated means of eva-
sion often involving layers of financial 
intermediaries. However, high-profile 
leaks from these intermediaries, such as 
the 2007 leak from HSBC Bank in Swit-
zerland and the 2015 “Panama Papers” 
from the firm Mossack Fonseca, have 
What tax burden do the  
superrich carry?
recently allowed researchers to gain 
insights into tax evasion by the richest. 
Alstadsæter, Johannesen, and Zucman 
use data from these leaks along with 
administrative data from Norway, Swe-
den, and Denmark to show that evasion 
rates rise across the income distribution, 
and conclude that the top 0.01% evade 
about 30% of the income and wealth 
taxes they owe.4 The authors link the 
account names from the HSBC leak with 
individual tax data and find that 95% of 
these foreign account holders did not 
report the existence of the account on 
their tax forms. They argue that this evi-
dence is consistent with a fixed cost ele-
ment to setting up evasion vehicles such 
as trusts and haven accounts, and that 
these costs are relatively small compared 
to the tax liability owed.
Capital gains and the plasticity of 
taxable income
One key determinant of the optimal taxa-
tion of the superrich is the behavioral 
response of the tax base to changes in the 
tax rate. For the superrich, this response 
depends crucially on what Scheuer and 
Slemrod call the “plasticity” of the tax 
base, i.e., the ease with which higher-
taxed income can be converted into 
lower-taxed income.2 Plasticity is an issue 
when different kinds of income are sub-
ject to different effective tax rates. By far 
the most important aspect of plasticity, 
with implications both for understanding 
the effective tax burden on the superrich 
and for measuring the extent of their 
income and therefore income inequality, 
concerns capital gains. Most countries’ 
tax systems treat capital gains favorably 
relative to ordinary labor income (Swit-
zerland being an extreme case where 
most capital gains are untaxed).
10
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Realized capital gains represent a very 
high fraction of the reported income of 
the superrich. For example, realized cap-
ital gains represented 60% of total gross 
income for the 400 highest-income 
Americans in tax year 2014. More gener-
ally, Figure 5 plots the distribution of net 
capital gains as a share of gross income 
across income groups for tax year 2016, 
which reveals their concentration at the 
very top: those earning more than $10 
million report net capital gains corre-
sponding to 46% of their total income, 
whereas capital gains are a negligible 
fraction of income for those earning less 
than $200 k.
Arguably, much of what shows up as 
capital gains of the superrich is in fact 
compensation for labor. An important 
example is founders’ stock. Founders of 
startup firms and their employees often 
receive relatively modest wage salaries 
because startups are typically short on 
cash. Instead, most of the compensation 
takes the form of company shares. When 
the startup is successful and reaches an 
exit, either by being sold to a larger com-
pany or by going public in an IPO, these 
shares often appreciate in value. When 
the owner sells the shares, the resulting 
income is taxed as capital gains, even 
though, from an economic perspective, it 
represents compensation for the labor 
effort during the startup phase of the 
company.i Of the wealthiest Americans 
according to the Forbes 400 list, found-
ers’ stock was crucial for many of them.
If the plasticity of converting labor com-
pensation into capital gains has changed 
over time, it has implications for inter-
preting tax-return-based measures of 
income inequality. While a successful 
inventor in 1959 might have worked for 
a big company, earned a nice raise, and 
increased income for his employer, the 
income might barely show up at all in 
2020, unless the founder sold her shares 
after an IPO, at which time there might 
be taxable capital gains. The implica-
tions for measured wealth would be dif-
ferent as well, as the inventor would 
gradually accrue wealth and the share-
holders would become wealthier in 
1959, while the wealth would be much 






















Fig. 5 Net capital gains as a share of adjusted gross income (AGI)
 across income groups
Source: Scheuer and Slemrod (2020a). 
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Tax advantages of capital gains 
and tax progressivity
There are three tax advantages in receiv-
ing income in the form of capital gains 
rather than ordinary labor income:
1. Capital gains are taxed at a preferen-
tially lower rate than other income. 
In the U.S., the top tax rate on long-
term capital gains is 20%, much 
lower than the top marginal tax rate 
of 37% on ordinary income. In Swit-
zerland, capital gains are not taxable 
at all. 
2. They are taxed upon realization 
rather than accrual, which generates 
a so-called deferral (or interest) 
advantage. This is because capital 
gains only are realized, and hence 
taxes become due, when the asset is 
sold, which typically occurs much 
later than when the capital gains had 
actually accrued (for example as 
measured by the market value of the 
underlying asset). 
3. Most importantly, capital gains are 
completely excused at death due to 
the “step-up” of tax basis for 
bequeathed assets that have appreci-
ated in value. In other words, if the 
owner of, say, some stocks never 
sells them during her lifetime, her 
heirs will not need to pay taxes on 
the capital gains that had accrued up 
to the time of her death.ii Compari-
sons between capital gain realiza-
tions reported on income tax returns 
with historical stock market gains 
suggest that a large share of all capi-
tal gains on corporate stock were 
never taxed because the gains were 
not realized during the holder’s life-
time and the stock holdings were 
passed along at death.
The concentration of capital gains at the 
very top and their preferential tax treat-
ment have led to concerns that the over-
all progressivity of the income tax is 
effectively being eroded. These structural 
problems with the income tax are best 
illustrated by considering some extreme 
examples. The richest person in the 
world, Jeff Bezos, owns roughly 12% of 
Amazon stock. Accordingly, his eco-
nomic income consists of about 12% of 
the profits of Amazon. How much tax 
does he pay on this income? First, Ama-
zon pays corporate income tax on its 
profits. How much precisely is hard to 
pin down due to tax reporting strategies 
that involve reporting profits in tax 
havens. U.S. corporations pay an average 
corporate income tax of roughly 16% of 
their profits, which can be taken as an 
optimistic estimate in the case of Ama-
zon. Since Amazon currently does not 
pay dividends and Bezos does not receive 
a wage salary, he would only pay per-
sonal income tax if he were to sell some 
of his Amazon shares. In this case, the 
proceeds would be taxed as capital gains 
at a preferential rate. In any case, it is 
clear that these taxes add up to a rather 
modest overall average tax rate.
Another example is Warren Buffett, cur-
rently number 3 on the Forbes 400 list. 
In 2015, Forbes reported his wealth to 
be $62 billion. Even if we assume a mod-
est rate of return of 5% on his wealth, 
we obtain a potential income flow of $3 
billion.iv Buffett released his tax return 
for 2015, which reported a gross income 
of only $11.6 million, mostly from the 
realization of capital gains. Hence, his 
income subject to taxation amounted to 
only a tiny fraction of his true economic 
income stream, and on top of that, it 
benefited from preferential tax treat-
ment. Indeed, Buffett himself complained 
that his average tax rate was lower than 
that of his secretary, which he believed 
to be wrong. This gave rise to the “Buf-
fett Rule” tax initiative under the 
Obama administration in 2011, which 
would have applied a minimum tax rate 
of 30% on individuals making more 
than one million dollars a year.
12
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Statutory taxes on 
the superrich in 
OECD countries
Income tax
Figure 6 shows the top statutory personal 
income tax rate, defined according to 
OECD (2018) as the combined central and 
subcentral government marginal personal 
income tax rate on wages at the earnings 
threshold where the top statutory personal 
income tax rate first applies, taking the 
effects of tax credits, the deductibility 
of subcentral taxes in central govern-
ment taxes, etc., into account. For 2018, 
this varied from 15% (Lithuania) to 57% 
(Sweden), with a median value of 46%. 
The threshold at which the top rate applies 
varies widely as a multiple of the average 
wage, from zero (in Hungary) where the 
rate schedule is flat, to 25 (in Mexico). For 
those with income far above the thresh-
old, the average tax rate, i.e., tax liability 
divided by income, should in principle 
be well approximated by the top rate, but 
some caveats are discussed below. 
Capital gains tax
Five OECD countries levy no tax on share- 
holders based on capital gains (Switzer-
land being a prominent example). Of those 
that do, all tax is on realization rather than 
on accrual. Five more countries apply no 
tax after the end of a holding period test, 
while four others apply a more favorable 
rate afterwards. The tax rate varies widely, 
with the highest as of 2016 being Finland,  
at 34%. With a few exceptions, the ac-
crued gains on assets in a decedent’s 
estate escape income taxation entirely, 
because the heir can treat the basis for tax 
purposes as the value upon inheritance.
Wealth transfer taxes
Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes. As of 
2017, 26 of the 35 OECD countries levied 
some kind of tax on wealth transfers; inter 
vivos gifts are included in the base in a 
few countries, while a separate gift tax 
In %
  Top Individual Income Tax Rate          Top Estate Tax Rate
Source: Scheuer and Slemrod (2020a). 
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Fig. 6 Maximum statutory tax rates in 2018
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Table 1 European wealth taxes
Notes: For countries without currently active wealth taxes, the table reports information as of the most recent active year. „x“ indi-
cates that no or insufficient information was available.
Source: Scheuer and Slemrod (2020b). 
[1] OECD Global Revenue Statistics Database, line 4210 (individual recurrent taxes on net wealth). For active coun-
tries, the value for 2018. For inactive countries, the value in the most recent active year with available data. For Ire-
land, McDonnell 2013, p. 24.  [2] OECD 2018, p. 76, Table 4.1. France abolished its wealth tax in 2017 and replaced it 
with a tax based on real estate; in 1096 (not a typo) Icelanders began paying a 1% tax on wealth (in fact, a tithe based 
on a 10% tax applied to an assumed 10% return on assets); Sweden made a major change in 1991; Switzerland’s 
cantons introduced the tax gradually, with full adoption by 1970.  [3]–[4] OECD 2018, p. 88, Figure 4.2, and various 
historical sources. Rates differ across Swiss cantons. The Spanish central government top rate is 2.5%; some regions 
levy higher rates (e.g., Extremadura’s top rate is 3.75%) while others levy lower rates (e.g., Madrid’s 100% credit 
results in an effective rate of 0%).  [5] OECD 2018, p. 81, Table 4.2. Taxpayers are taxed individually in Finland and 
Spain. Exemptions differ across Swiss cantons. The Spanish central government statutory individual exemption is € 
700,000; some regions have lower exemptions, including Aragon at € 400,000 and Catalonia at € 500,000.  [6] OECD 
2018, pp. 87–88. The Swiss canton of Basel Country has a schedule with rates increasing for each CHF 1,000 of 
reported wealth, up to CHF 1 million.  [7] OECD 2018, pp. 88–89.* In some cantons, but not all.  [8]–[11] OECD 2018, 
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regime exists in others. Most countries 
levy an inheritance tax where the liability 
lies with the recipient and the rate of tax 
depends on their relationship of the heir 
to the deceased. A prominent exception 
is the U.S., which levies an estate tax 
irrespective of the heirs’ circumstances 
and relationship to the deceased (with the 
exception of spouses). The exemption lev-
els and rates vary starkly. Most countries 
have a relatively low exemption along with 
a graduated rate structure, the U.S. again 
being the exception, having an exemption 
of $11.4 million per individual in 2019 and 
a flat rate of 40%.
Annual net wealth tax
While twelve OECD countries levied an 
annual tax on net wealth in 1990, only four 
– France, Norway, Spain, and Switzer- 
land – still imposed such a tax in 2018, 
with Switzerland raising more than three 
times as much revenue as a fraction of 
total revenues (3.9%) as any of the other 
three countries (OECD, 2018). France 
replaced its annual wealth tax with a tax 
only on immovable property in 2018. Italy 
levies an annual tax on financial assets. 
The Netherlands has a hybrid system with 
similarities to an annual wealth tax, imput-
ing an asset-type-specific rate of return to 
assets and assessing a 30% tax on those 
imputed returns.iii
Table 1 provides some summary statistics 
about the OECD countries’ wealth taxes 
based on Scheuer and Slemrod.5 A few 
aspects are especially worth noting:
1. The top rates of both the Sanders 
and Warren proposals are far higher 
than any top rate of the OECD wealth 
taxes. The average top rate was about 
1%, and the highest of all is that of 
the Spanish region Extremadura, at 
3.75%. However, the Spanish system 
and certain Swiss cantons feature a 
cap on the sum of wealth and income 
taxes as a fraction of taxable income, 
which is a feature of neither the 
Sanders nor Warren proposals. Such 
a cap limits the liquidity problem of a 
high ratio of tax liability to disposable 
income (and imposes a zero marginal 
tax on wealth for those at the cap). 
2. Many of the OECD wealth taxes fea-
tured exemption or preferential treat-
ment of some forms of assets, notably 
the main residence, life insurance 
proceeds, pension wealth, and busi-
ness assets. The Warren and Sanders 
proposals have no such exemptions, 
and extend the base to certain assets 
that few countries in the OECD in-
cluded, such as assets held in trusts, 
retirement assets, and assets held by 
minor children. 
3. The exemption level of the other coun-
tries’ wealth taxes are much lower 
than Sanders and Warren proposed, 
averaging just about €500,000 for 
married couples, far less than the 
Sanders and Warren exemption levels 
of $32 million and $50 million for mar-
ried couples, respectively. 
Of the dozen OECD countries that have 
had a wealth tax in the last three de-
cades, only a quarter still do. Why did 
the other three-quarters abandon them? 
A 2018 OECD report refers to efficiency 
costs, risk of capital flight, failure to meet 
redistributive goals, and concerns about 
high administrative costs. In Germany, the 
Federal Constitutional Court deemed the 
wealth tax unconstitutional in 1995 on 
the grounds that the tax’s discrimination 
of property and financial assets was an 
infringement against the fiscal principle 
of tax equality. While this could be fixed in 
principle, it has not yet been attempted. 
In Sweden, it was argued that the special 
treatment of business equity made the 
wealth tax regressive, taxing middle-class 
wealth (housing, financial assets) and 
exempting the wealthiest individuals’ as-
sets (large, closely held firms); moreover, 
the wealth tax was blamed for spurring tax 
avoidance and evasion, including capital 
flight to tax havens.6
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What should a fair tax
system look like?
We now turn to the normative question 
– how should the superrich be taxed?
The classic view
The canonical view posits that top earn-
ers are rich simply because they have a 
greater income-earning ability than most 
everyone else. To the degree that such an 
unequal distribution of abilities is out-
side of our control, it naturally gives rise 
to a redistributive motive. For example, 
behind the veil of ignorance, we could 
agree to “insure” against the realization 
of ability draws, determined ultimately 
by the birth lottery. This justifies tax 
policies that redistribute some share of 
top incomes away from the superrich 
and towards less fortunate, lower-ability 
earners.
Of course, the inequality-reducing effects 
of redistributive taxation need to be bal-
anced with the disincentive effects. Pre-
cisely how this tradeoff should be 
resolved depends crucially on one’s politi-
cal attitudes towards inequality. Yet, it is 
hard to agree on this based on scientific 
principles (and, in fact, there are a variety 
of redistributive preferences in the popu-
lation). Therefore, rather than trying to 
determine the optimal tax policy, it 
should be accepted that there will be dif-
ferent views on it, and instead the focus 
should lie on ruling out tax policies that 
everyone agrees to be undesirable.
This approach allows us to isolate the 
revenue effects of taxing the superrich.7 
Figure 7 plots the relationship between 
the top marginal tax rate and the total 
revenue raised from top earners, which is 
commonly referred to as a “Laffer 
curve” after the economist Arthur Laffer. 
Of course, when the tax rate is low, tax 
revenue is low as well. As we increase 
the tax, revenue increases but less than 
proportionally because the rising tax rate 
discourages economic activity, and hence 
the tax base shrinks. At some point, the 
additional revenues from the tax increase 
are outweighed by the reduction in the 
tax base, which occurs at the peak of the 
Laffer curve. Increasing taxes beyond 
this point is counterproductive: the same 
amount of revenue could be achieved by 
imposing a lower tax rate. This logic is 
familiar from the typical political rheto-
ric in favor of “self-financing” tax cuts.
It is clear that any tax rate to the right of 
the peak of the Laffer curve is inefficient 
in the sense that everyone could be made 
better off: taxing top earners at a lower 
rate both makes them better off and raises 
additional revenues, which can be used to 
benefit lower earners. On the other hand, 
tax rates to the left of the peak could be 
justified depending on society’s redistrib-
utive preferences. For example, if one 
mostly cared about helping the poorest 
Tax revenue
Tax ratet*
Fig. 7 The Laffer curve
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members of society, one would go all the 
way up to tax rate t*, which raises maxi-
mal revenue from the top income tax 
bracket and allows a transfer of these 
funds to the poor. However, someone 
with less extreme inequality aversion 
would prefer a lower top tax rate. In any 
case, the revenue-maximizing tax rate t* 
is a useful benchmark, since it provides 
an upper bound to the taxation of the 
rich that should not be exceeded.
For this reason, it is of particular interest 
to figure out where precisely the peak  
of the Laffer curve lies. This crucially 
depends on two statistics:
1. The concentration of income in the 
top income tax bracket. The greater 
the total amount of income those 
affected by the top marginal tax rate 
earn, the more tax revenue can 
potentially be raised by increasing 
the tax rate they face. 
2. The behavioral response of top earn-
ers to tax changes, which is often 
referred to as the elasticity of taxable 
income. It determines how much 
economic activity is discouraged – 
and hence how much the tax base 
shrinks – when the tax rate rises. If 
the elasticity is large, the tax base 
erodes quickly when we increase tax-
ation, which implies that the reve-
nue-maximizing tax rate is low. 
A large body of research has estimated 
these two parameters. Even though there 
is some uncertainty around these esti-
mates (see Scheuer and Slemrod for an 
overview)2, middle-of-the-range studies 
suggest a revenue-maximizing top mar-
ginal tax rate of roughly 60% to 70%. 
This indicates that there is still consider-
able room in most countries to further 
increase top marginal tax rates, starting 
from current levels, without running into 
the downward-sloping part of the Laffer 
curve. Some recent proposals, however, 
such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s  
envisioned 70% marginal tax rate on 
incomes in excess of $10 million, might 
exceed the upper bound according  
to these estimates.
Superstar effects
Many economists believe that “superstar 
effects” play an important role in the rise 
of top income inequality. The idea is that 
relatively small differences in ability or 
effort among workers are amplified by 
other factors, such as technology or  
globalization, leading to dramatic differ-
ences in pay. In a classic example, the 
advent of television enabled a small share 
of performers to capture a massive audi-
ence, leaving other artists in the dust.  
A superstar story has also been used to 
explain the growing divergence in CEO 
compensation. In this narrative, larger, 
more productive firms snatch up more 
talented managers. Being surrounded by 
more efficient workers, having access to 
better resources, and commanding larger 
markets gives these managers an extra 
kick to their productivity – a comple-
mentarity. Hence, the matching of 
slightly more talented managers with 
larger firms accounts for the large differ-
ence in income between superstar CEOs 
and the rest of the pack. Because the dis-
tribution of firm sizes is extremely fat 
tailed – and has become increasingly so 
in the course of automation and global-
ization – top managers can make very 
large sums that eclipse any apparent dif-
ferences in underlying skill or effort.
If superstars comprise a substantial por-
tion of the superrich, how does this 
change the way they should be taxed? 
With earnings disproportionate to inher-
ent skills, it may appear intuitive that 
superstar effects tilt the calculus balanc-
ing efficiency and equality, worsening 
inequality, and leading to higher optimal 
tax rates on the rich. However, the work 
of Scheuer and Werning shows that 
there is another effect.7 Because superstar 
effects lead to a steep relationship between 
effort and earnings, they increase the 
behavioral earnings response to any tax 
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change. Intuitively, a worker induced to 
provide greater effort by way of lower 
taxes anticipates being matched with a 
better job, with better pay, and this fur-
ther amplifies the incentive for effort. 
This provides a force for lower taxes. 
Quantifying this effect, Scheuer and 
Werning find that taking superstar phe-
nomena at the top of the distribution 
into account lowers the revenue-maxi-
mizing top marginal tax rate by more 
than 10 percentage points compared to 
the standard calibration.7
Complementarities
Recently, much attention has been 
devoted to the impact of technological 
change on wage inequality, with a focus 
on the assignment of skilled and un- 
skilled workers to different tasks and 
occupations (see e.g. UBS Public Paper 
No. 8).8 A key feature is that there is 
imperfect substitutability across sectors 
in the economy (routine versus abstract 
tasks, manufacturing versus services, 
entrepreneurs versus workers), which 
implies that relative wages react to the 
aggregate allocation of employment. 
Rothschild and Scheuer argue that these 
technological shifts imply a force for less 
progressive taxation relative to a world 
with fixed wages.9
To understand the basic intuition, sup-
pose there are two occupations, entrepre-
neurs and workers, and individuals are 
free to select into either depending on 
their skills. There is an income tax (which 
does not condition on occupations) to 
redistribute across individuals. If there 
are disproportionately more entrepre-
neurs at higher incomes, the government 
can exploit tax-induced general equilib-
rium effects to enhance redistribution 
from high- to low-income individuals: 
Lowering taxes on high earners will dis-
proportionately spur effort among entre-
preneurs. As a result, entrepreneurs will 
want to hire more workers, which will 
raise the worker’s wages by stimulating 
labor demand. These “trickle down” 
effects (by which lower earners can ben-
efit from tax cuts on higher earners) 
therefore also push for lower taxes at  
the very top.
Spillovers
In what we have discussed so far, the 
return to an individual equals his or her 
contribution to society. In this view, top 
incomes, no matter how high, reflect a 
correspondingly high social marginal 
product. Some recent policy discussion 
about rising inequality, however, has 
questioned whether top incomes result 
from extraordinary economic productiv-
ity. The financial crisis, for instance, 
exposed numerous examples of highly 
compensated individuals whose apparent 
contributions to aggregate output proved 
illusory. The “Occupy” movement 
lamented that some of the income 
growth for the top 1% may have been at 
the expense of the bottom 99%. Accord-
ingly, the view that some top incomes 
reflect rent-seeking – i.e., the pursuit of 
personal enrichment by enlarging one’s 
slice of the existing economic pie rather 
than by increasing the size of that pie – 
has inspired calls for a more steeply  
progressive tax code.
Rent-seeking is an example of a negative 
externality. Intuitively, the optimal pol-
icy is to levy a “corrective” tax equal to 
the marginal social damage. For exam-
ple, if an activity provides a private 
return of one dollar but reduces others’ 
income by 50 cents, the required correc-
tion is a tax of 50%. If some sectors or 
Taking superstars at the top of 
the distribution into account 
lowers the revenue-maximizing 
top marginal tax rate substan-
tially.
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professions are more prone to rent-seek-
ing than others, sector-specific corrective 
surcharges could be used to discourage 
these activities while redirecting individ-
uals to more productive behavior. For 
instance, higher taxes on financial-sector 
bonus payments have been proposed 
based on the idea that they result from 
contest-like tournaments or races with 
“winner-takes-all” compensation, such 
as high-speed trading. Others have 
argued that lawyers engage in rent-seek-
ing activities akin to zero-sum games, or 
that CEOs can raise their pay artificially, 
for instance due to luck or by stacking a 
board of directors in their favor.
Research by Rothschild and Scheuer 
shows that it is not generally enough to 
know how much rent-seeking there is at 
any given income level in order to deter-
mine the optimal “corrective” adjust-
ment to the income tax.10 Examining at 
whose expense overpaid individuals ben-
efit is also critical. If CEO pay hikes are 
at the expense of productive workers fur-
ther down the distribution, then raising 
top tax rates leads to an increase in more 
fruitful activities, and the optimal correc-
tion is even higher than the simple intu-
ition above would suggest. But if top 
earners are making outsize incomes by 
winning against others in the same line 
of work, raising taxes could backfire. 
One example is high-speed trading. If the 
most profitable traders faced higher 
taxes, that would discourage their activ-
ity – the intended effect. But this in turn 
would also make it easier for other, less 
efficient, traders who compete against 
them, with the unintended effect of 
potentially drawing even more traders 
into the fray.
Other forms of spillovers could be rele-
vant as well. Some top earners might be 
paid below their marginal product, such 
as innovators who only appropriate a 
fraction of the value of their innovations. 
A frequently cited example is Steve Jobs, 
who provided valuable new products to 
the market and whose value to society 
presumably exceeded his compensation. 
Yet another kind of externality, perhaps 
particularly relevant at the top, arises 
from “positional” concerns where indi-
viduals compare themselves to others 
and fail to internalize that increasing 
their income makes others less happy. 
For instance, if people care about earn-
ing more than their colleagues or neigh-
bors rather than just their absolute 
amount of income, we may end up in a 
“rat race” where everyone works too 
much, which could be corrected through 
the tax system.v
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Should wealth be taxed?
It is clear that growing inequality in 
earnings affects the degree of wealth 
inequality down the road due to savings. 
This raises the question whether these 
trends not only shift the tradeoff for the 
optimal taxation of labor income, but 
also for the taxation of capital or wealth.
Taxing existing wealth
One argument in favor of taxes on 
wealth is that policy makers who con-
sider a potential tax reform face a situa-
tion with preexisting wealth inequality. 
In other words, future labor incomes 
alone do not entirely determine future 
wealth. Instead, individuals already  
differ in the wealth they own, either 
because they have inherited it from pre-
vious generations or because they them-
selves have saved in the past. When 
deciding how to design tax policy going 
forward, one needs to recognize that this 
initial wealth inequality, which must be 
taken as given from today’s perspective, 
will partially shape future wealth 
inequality.
In principle, preexisting wealth inequality 
could be redistributed in a lump-sum 
fashion through a one-time, unantici-
pated wealth tax. Indeed, various coun-
tries have historically used one-time 
wealth taxes to deal with revenue require- 
ments, such as wartime spending shocks. 
In 1999, Donald Trump, then a candi-
date for the Reform Party presidential 
nomination, proposed a 14.25% one-
time “net worth tax” on individuals and 
trusts worth more than $10 million in 
order to eliminate U.S. national debt in 
one swoop. More recently, calls have 
been made for a time-limited, progressive 
wealth levy to stem the fiscal burden 
from the coronavirus pandemic.
From an optimal tax perspective, these 
policies are attractive because they 
avoid behavioral distortions by only 
touching wealth that has already 
accrued. Nevertheless, this appealing 
feature critically hinges on policy mak-
ers’ ability to implement them on short 
notice and on their commitment not  
to make them permanent or reintroduce 
them when similar times come about  
in the future. In the past, originally 
one-off war taxes have often turned 
into long-lasting tax policies.
The existing wealth taxes, such as the 
Swiss example, and the recent U.S. pro-
posals are permanent policies, however. 
Since individuals anticipate that their 
future savings will be subject to the tax, 
this will of course distort their savings 
incentives. Nonetheless, since preexisting 
wealth makes up a significant portion of 
future wealth, the work of Scheuer and 
Slemrod shows that a tax on wealth 
accrual, on top of a progressive labor 
income tax, is in general optimal even in 
the medium to long run.4
A tax on wealth accrual, on top 
of a progressive labor income 
tax, is in general optimal – even 
in the medium to long run.
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Wealth versus capital income taxes
The discussion above does not define the 
appropriate tax instruments for taxing 
capital accumulation. Most countries 
have both progressive income taxes, 
which already tax the return on savings, 
as well as inheritance and gift taxes, 
which tax the transfer of wealth across 
generations. Indeed, there is a close  
connection between wealth taxes and 
taxes on capital income. For example, 
assume that all wealth earns an annual 
return of 4%; then levying a tax rate of 
25% on capital income is equivalent to 
imposing a tax rate of 1% directly on 
the wealth each year. Conversely, a 2% 
wealth tax is equivalent to a 50% capi-
tal income tax and a 4% wealth tax 
would correspond to a 100% tax on 
capital income. Given the existence of 
capital income taxes, what might justify 
levying a wealth tax instead, or in addi-
tion?
One such argument, which goes back to 
Nobel Laureate Maurice Allais, is based 
on the observation that different wealth 
holders achieve different rates of return 
on their investments.11 Some might be 
innovative entrepreneurs with promising 
business ideas, others just hold on to 
their wealth without investing it profit-
ably. In this case, the capital-income-tax 
equivalent of a given wealth tax rate is 
also heterogeneous: the higher is the 
return, the lower is the equivalent capital 
income tax, so that more productive 
entrepreneurs face a lower capital-
income-tax equivalent. As a result, a 
wealth tax imposes a higher burden on 
“idle,” low-return wealth and therefore 
encourages the reallocation of capital 
from unproductive to productive entre-
preneurs.
There is, however, an opposing effect.  
If heterogeneous returns reflect hetero-
geneous windfall gains, rents, or excess 
profits (e.g. due to market power or 
inside information), rather than actual 
productivity differences, then taxing 
those away has well-known efficiency 
benefits. However, a wealth tax gets this 
exactly reversed – it taxes the normal 
rate of return and leaves the excess 
returns untouched. For example, if all 
investors have a real rate of return of 
2%, but some earn additional excess 
profits on their investments, then a 2% 
wealth tax would not target any of those 
rents, whereas a capital income tax would. 
This is because a wealth tax is equivalent 
to a unit tax on the rate of return rather 
than an ad valorem tax. Moreover, as we 
have argued above, much of what shows 
up as return to capital on the tax returns 
of the superrich (e.g. in the form of real-
ized capital gains) is likely compensation 
to labor. A wealth tax again only taxes 
some normal return, while a capital 
income tax hits the full extent of such 
shifted labor compensation.
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Of the three European countries that still 
levy a wealth tax, Switzerland is the only 
one that raises a nonnegligible share of 
overall tax revenue with it. Total revenue 
from the Swiss wealth tax amounted to 
1.1% of GDP in 2018, which is in a similar 
ballpark as the revenues projected for the 
recent U.S. proposals. Hence, the Swiss 
example is of particular interest for the 
wealth tax debate in the United States.
The wealth tax in Switzerland has a long 
history and in fact predates the modern 
income tax. The Swiss tax system is gen-
erally structured in three layers: the fed-
eral, cantonal, and municipal level. There 
is no federal wealth tax, but all cantons 
must levy a comprehensive wealth tax. 
Apart from that, cantons have significant 
freedom in designing wealth taxation. 
Nine cantons impose flat rates (above 
some exemption level) and the other 17 
feature progressive schedules. Each mu-
nicipality then chooses a multiplier that 
is applied proportionally to the cantonal 
tax rate schedule. Hence, an individual’s 
overall tax liability depends on both the 
canton and municipality of residence. 
Unlike the recent proposals in the U.S., 
which all involve a federal wealth tax, this 
highly decentralized system induces local 
tax competition.
In Figures 8 and 9, we collected the top 
marginal tax rates as well as the tax-
exempted wealth amount (for married 
couples) for all Swiss cantons from the 
cantonal tax laws in 2018.vi The (com-
bined cantonal and municipal) marginal 
wealth tax rates in the top bracket ranged 
between 0.1% (canton of Nidwalden) and 
1.1% (canton of Geneva). In 16 of the 26 
canton capitals, the annual top wealth tax 
rate was below 0.5%. There is also some 
variation in the tax-exempted amounts, 
although they are generally relatively low, 
ranging from CHF 50,000 in the canton of 
Obwalden to CHF 250,000 in the canton 
of Schwyz. Hence, even though it raises 
The Swiss wealth tax
similar overall revenue as some U.S. pro-
posals, the Swiss wealth tax is much less 
progressive and targeted at a larger share 
of the population.
The base of the Swiss wealth tax is broad: 
in principle, all assets, including those  
held abroad, are taxable. Only foreign real  
In %
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 0.0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.0  1.2
22
UBS Center Public Paper Taxing the superrich: Challenges of a fair tax system
estate, usual household assets, and 
accrued pension wealth are exempt. 
The tax liability is based on net wealth, 
so taxpayers can deduct their obliga-
tions (such as mortgages or other debt). 
The annual reporting requirements for 
assets and liabilities allow the cantonal 
tax authorities to track the year-to-year 
evolution of wealth and cross-check it 
against reported income (the so-called 
wealth development test), so the wealth 
tax serves a supporting role for income 
tax enforcement.
There are several particularities of the 
Swiss tax system that limit the degree to 
which its experience with a wealth tax  
can be generalized to other countries:
1. Capital gains on movable assets (e.g. 
shares) are tax-exempt in Switzer-
land unless the owner professionally 
trades with securities. This is not 
the case in many other countries. In 
particular, the Warren and Sanders 
proposals in the U.S. involve introduc-
ing a wealth tax on top of the existing 
taxation of capital gains, and reform-
ing the latter towards a less preferen-
tial treatment. 
2. Almost all Swiss cantons have 
gradually abolished taxes on gifts and 
inheritances from parents to children, 
and there is no federal tax on be-
quests. 
3. Due to the institution of bank secrecy 
within Switzerland, third party report-
ing of financial assets is precluded, 
which limits tax enforcement. More-
over, the valuation of privately held 
business assets is subject to consider-
able discretion on the part of cantonal 
tax authorities, which may contribute 
to an equilibrium where the wealthy 




















  Exemption Amounts (Married Couples) in CHF 



























Fig. 9 Maximum wealth amounts before any wealth tax liability is 
 generated for married couples in the Swiss cantons
23
In sum, there is a defect in the income tax 
with regard to capital gains and bequests. 
The wealth tax therefore serves as a back-
stop to at least partly substitute for these 
instruments, which are commonly used in 
other countries but lacking in Switzerland.vii
So far, the Swiss case is the only mod-
ern example for a wealth tax in an OECD 
country that has been able to generate 
sizeable and stable revenues in the long 
run. It enjoys broad support, as evidenced 
by the fact that it keeps being reaffirmed 
by citizens in Switzerland’s direct democ-
racy, where most tax decisions must be 
put directly to voters. However, its design 
and the role it plays in the overall tax 
system are quite different from current 
proposals in the United States. In particu-
lar, it is not geared towards a major re-
distribution of wealth, and indeed wealth 





The recent extent and growth of inequal-
ity has produced fears that it may lead to 
political instability. In a democracy, for 
example, a course of tax policy must reg-
ularly stand the test of elections. This 
raises the question whether it is politi-
cally sustainable, in the sense that it must 
maintain the support of a majority of cit-
izens over time. Scheuer and Wolitzky 
show that this requires taxing the wealth 
accrual of the rich, while subsidizing that 
of the middle class.12 The reason is that 
there is always a temptation in the future 
to reform whatever policy had been orig-
inally announced to try to attain a 
greater equalization of wealth because 
wealth accumulation will have been sunk 
at this time. Policy makers therefore real-
ize that letting wealth concentration 
explode will lead to an unstable situation 
in the future, where a majority of voters 
will prefer a progressive reform. Antici-
pating this, individuals would save and 
invest very little in the first place, leading 
eventually to a poor outcome for every-
one. Hence, from an ex ante perspective, 
it is better to design tax policy in such a 
way that it will defeat any future reform 
threat in terms of popular support. This 
is achieved by reducing wealth inequality 
through a tax on the savings of the rich, 
and by creating a middle class that accu-
mulates just enough wealth to become 
unfavorable to more extreme redistribu-
tion in the future.
From this perspective, the role of the 
wealth tax is to make the system more 
stable, with limited inequality, so that it 
can resist the threat of political upheaval 
looming in the background. These 
threats were important drivers of tax and 
welfare state policies in 19th and 20th 
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century Europe, when the socialist move-
ment gained momentum, and they are 
palpable today in many South American 
countries (Venezuela being an example 
that was not resilient, with disastrous 
consequences).
Another fundamental observation in 
political economy is that wealth can buy 
political influence. The concern is that, 
even in a “one-man, one-vote” democ-
racy, billionaires can affect politics more 
than others through campaign contribu-
tions, ownership of media outlets, or 
funding lobbying activities. Indeed, there 
is evidence that political decisions are 
often more sensitive to the preferences of 
the rich than to those of the median 
voter.13 Accordingly, proponents of a 
progressive wealth tax have argued that 
reducing the wealth of the superrich is a 
desirable objective in itself, beyond the 
revenue it could raise. In this vein, Bernie 
Sanders famously said “I don’t think bil-
lionaires should exist.”
Even if concerns about an extreme con-
centration of wealth and political power 
are warranted, it is not clear how a 
wealth tax would help fix the problem. 
Other instruments may be better targeted 
at ensuring a more equal political repre-
sentation, such as regulating campaign 
contributions and Super PACs. Some 
European countries with similar degrees 
of inequality offer examples of democra-
cies where money plays a smaller role in 
politics than in the United States. One 
particular concern with the wealth tax is 
that it might encourage political dona-
tions (as they reduce tax liability) and 
thereby further stimulate political 
engagement of wealthy individuals.
Policy alternatives
Several alternatives to a wealth tax have 
been proposed to achieve its primary 
goal of increasing the progressivity of the 
U.S. tax system. As discussed above 
(page 11), the current system exhibits 
structural deficiencies in the treatment of 
capital gains. Many have therefore pro-
posed fixing these defects directly.
Indeed, Joe Biden has released plans  
to tax capital gains and dividends at the 
same rate as ordinary income for tax- 
payers with incomes exceeding $1 mil-
lion and to tax unrealized capital gains 
at death. His plan would also increase 
income tax rates for taxpayers with 
incomes over $400,000 from 37% to 
39.6%. Hence, the top marginal tax rate 
for capital gains would increase from 
20% to 39.6%. However, his plan does 
not include a wealth tax.
While Biden’s plan would eliminate two  
of the preferential provisions for capital 
gains, it would retain the current system 
of taxation based on realization rather 
than accrual and thereby preserve the 
within-a-lifetime tax deferral advantage. 
Moreover, a realization-based treatment 
does not fix the problem of very low tax 
burdens for superrich individuals who 
neither receive much ordinary nor divi-
dend income nor sell many shares of the 
businesses they own. In view of this, calls 
for the taxation of accrued capital gains 
have been made. An accrual-based capi-
tal gains tax is straightforward to imple-
ment for publicly traded assets because 
one can rely on market prices and third- 
party-reported transactions. For illiquid 
assets, however, such as privately held 
businesses, which are a significant source 
of returns for rich households, it runs 
into similar problems as a wealth tax 
because these assets are difficult to value 
objectively. Moreover, it might force 
entrepreneurs to continually reduce their 
share in a company whose valuation 
increases over time in order pay the tax 
liability, another feature it shares with a 
wealth tax. Even if monetary incentives 
are not the primary motivation for these 
entrepreneurs, who are instead mostly 
interested in being able to realize their 
ideas, such a dilution of control rights 
could have discouraging effects early on, 
for example, when young individuals 
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decide whether to become entrepreneurs 
in the first place.
A potential solution to these problems is 
a retrospective accrual tax. Under such a 
scheme, the tax is assessed upon realiza-
tion, but the statutory tax rate rises as 
the holding period lengthens, effectively 
charging interest on past gains when 
realization occurs. This eliminates the 
need to value assets except when sold 
while minimizing liquidity problems and 
the incentive to defer such realization. 
The table below summarizes the advan-
tages and disadvantages of wealth taxes 
versus these different forms of capital 
gains taxation.
Overview of the pros and cons of wealth versus capital 
gains taxes
Notes: 
I A wealth tax encourages the reallocation of capital from unproductive to productive investors relative to a capital gains tax.
II A wealth tax only taxes the normal rate of return on investments whereas a capital gains tax is also able to target excess returns.
III A wealth tax and an accrual-based capital gains tax require the valuation of untraded assets whereas a realization-based or retro- 
 spective capital gains tax only relies on market transactions.
IV A realization-based capital gains tax induces deferral incentives by providing an interest advantage since tax payments are only  
 due when gains are realized. A wealth tax as well as accrual-based and retrospective capital gains taxes remove this advantage.
Wealth tax
Accrual-based
Capital gains tax 
Realization-based  Retrospective
I 
 Allocating capital efficiently 
across investors with  
different rates of return
+  – – –
II
 Capturing excess returns  
and shifted labor income – + + +
III 
Difficulty of valuing illiquid 
assets – – + +
IV 
 Eliminating deferral  
advantage + + – +
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Concerns about inequality and its con-
sequences have led to widely discussed 
proposals for increasing the tax burden 
on the superrich. Apart from calls for 
higher top marginal income taxes, two 
leading presidential candidates of the 
Democratic Party in the U.S. have pro-
posed a new, highly progressive annual 
wealth tax. As their candidacies fal-
tered, so did the attention to their pro-
posals, although the coronavirus pande- 
mic has revived calls for a one-time 
wealth tax to help fund the massive fis-
cal interventions it has engendered.
Whether these ideas constitute good 
policy depends on a number of factors, 
such as the effects of income and wealth 
concentration on the desired function-
ing of the political system and the 
appropriate weight to put on the well-
being of the superrich versus other citi-
zens. This Public Paper concentrates on 
the critical factors in designing the taxa-
tion of the superrich that are right in the 
wheelhouse of modern research on tax-
ation. It provides upper bounds to the 
optimal rate of tax depending on the 
elasticity of behavioral responses to tax 
changes as well as the sources of the 
riches of the superrich – are they super-
stars, rent seekers, or job creators?
We emphasize that various tax bases 
might be used to tax the superrich and 
that their elasticities depend on the non-
rate aspects of a tax system. Notably, 
the current tax system exhibits deficien-
cies when it comes to the treatment of 
capital gains. Whether fixing them 
should involve a wealth tax hinges on 
the costs of implementing it and on the 
attractiveness of alternative policies, 
such as reforms that address capital 
gains taxation directly. We also review 
Conclusion 
the experience of other OECD countries 
that have levied a wealth tax in the 
recent past, although now only three 
retain them. The Swiss example is par-
ticularly useful, but it involves relatively 
low rates along with a low level of 
wealth exempted, and it also features 
particular enforcement details such as 
the extent of third-party reporting of 
wealth. 
In sum, there are effective tools for 
restoring tax progressivity where it has 
been eroding and for at least stabilizing 
the increase in inequality many countries 
have experienced at the top. A growing 
share of society cares deeply about these 
issues, and a precise understanding of 
both the roots of inequality and the 
effects of tax policy will help to inject 
some objectivity into the ongoing debate 
about taxing the superrich.
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i. Other examples of capital gains that are likely to be relabeled labor income are 
compensation in the form of stock options and the fees charged for the manage-
ment of investment portfolios. 
ii. At the same time, the income that gives rise to the appreciation of some capital 
assets, such as corporate stock, is subject to taxation at the corporate level.
iii. Several non-OECD countries have had wealth taxes, including Argentina, Ban-
gladesh (more recently a net worth-triggered income tax surcharge or net wealth 
tax, whichever is higher), Colombia, India (repealed in 2015), Indonesia (abol-
ished in 1985), Pakistan (removed in 2003 and reinstated in 2013), and Sri Lanka 
(1959–1993).
iv. The average real growth rate of billionaire wealth has been 7% to 8% over the 
last decades.
v. In the case of behavioral distortions or “internalities,” a paternalistic govern-
ment could use “corrective” income taxes on similar grounds. For instance, top 
earners may be disproportionately plagued by workaholism.
vi. The municipal multipliers in the main city of each canton are obtained from 
“Vermögenssteuer natürlicher Personen,” Dokumentation und Information, 
Eidgenössische Steuerverwaltung (2018).
vii. As for immovable property, there is a special capital gains tax for real estate at 
the cantonal level. Moreover, about half of all municipalities also levy a prop-
erty tax on real estate (with rates up to 0.3%), based on the gross value of the 
property. Finally, an estimate of the rental value of owner-occupied housing 
must be reported as taxable income for income tax purposes. On the other 
hand, the valuation rules used by the cantonal tax authorities to assess real 
estate property imply that it is typically valued below market for tax purposes, 
and this latter advantage often outweighs the double taxation.
Notes 
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position of Zurich, and Switzerland more 
generally, as a leading location for educa-
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